

# Security Audit

DATE 28/04/2022

## Executive Summary.

This security audit for the Kings Road BID area was completed by combining visual environmental assessments at different times of the day along with diagnostic interviews and overlapping the findings from the audit for The Knightsbridge Partnership BID and gap analysis for Sloane Street with businesses across the following areas:

1. Retail.
2. F&B / NTE
3. Landowners / management companies.

This was complimented by interviews with neighbourhood police.

In terms of crime and ASB the audit assessed the known issues through assessment of national reported crime and ASB data along with the views of those interviewed and observations. This was complimented by the Cadogan Estate plan for the development of Sloane Street

By taking academic views on board the audit sort to identify how the BID, in partnership, can best strategically support the long-term and immediate reduction of crime and ASB along with improving the perception of safety and the resilience of the area in the event of a major incident or terrorist attack.

The key areas that the audit interviews with businesses assessed were:

1. Internal security provisions.
2. CCTV and radio communications.
3. Intelligence flow.
4. Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.
5. Steps taken in preparedness for a critical Incident / terrorist attack.
6. Possession of 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.

Whilst the area has some effective and good practice it is largely fragmented when considering the BID area as an integrated community. Far stronger cohesion tended to be based on the nature and size of the business.

The low presence of CCTV in the public realm, no effective live communication across the entire BID area and low levels of security presence are a concern.

The culmination is a set of 24 recommendations for the BID board to consider based of the observations, interviews and known facts.

## Introduction.

The Kings Road BID spans from Peter Jones on the eastern edge of Kings Road, west, to Beaufort Street.

The BID area is entirely contained within The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea with the footprint including parts of three policing neighbourhoods namely:

- Royal Hospital
- Stanley
- Chelsea Riverside

A key function for all BID areas is to improve and market the attractiveness of their areas with a clear focus on reducing crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB) along with the critical factor of making visitors and workers feel safe usually through the deployment of uniformed security patrols; progressive partnership working, along with clean, well maintained public realm areas.

Maintaining the public realm is important to reducing crime and ASB and is a principal tenet when taking account of *Broken Windows Theory*<sup>1</sup> which explores how to reduce low-level, high-volume crime and disorder.

This report explores how the Kings Road BID can deliver these benefits to the area, a global attraction against the backdrop of emerging from the impact of COVID, BREXIT and the threat from International terrorism including taking note of the comments and recommendations, to date, from 'The Manchester Arena Inquiry' chaired by the Honourable Sir John Saunders.

## Methodology.

The audit has been split into three distinct assessments.

Firstly, an assessment of official police data from the [www.police.uk](http://www.police.uk) website.

Secondly, undertaking several visual environmental audits that have taken place during the early morning, lunchtime, evening, and night-time.

Thirdly, carrying out diagnostic interviews with some businesses and their employees.

The combined findings, observations, and comments of members along with consultation with statutory authorities concludes with commentary on matters relating to the prevention and reduction of crime along with recommendations for the BID Board to consider improving resilience in the area in the event of a major event or terrorist attack.

Some recommendations require multi-lateral agreements whilst others are unilateral.

The complexity and potential cost of each work stream has been the determining factor as to whether the recommendation is a short, medium, or long-term objective.

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<sup>1</sup> *Wilson and Kelling 1982*

## Reported Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour.

The BID footprint is contained within the policing neighbourhoods of 'Royal Hospital', 'Stanley' and 'Chelsea Riverside'.


The following graphs are taken from national police data for 'Royal Hospital' and are the latest published figures as of 1<sup>st</sup> April 2021.

The below graph sets out the quarterly track of reported crime and ASB (this is only that reported to police and not RBKC).


The track is typical of Central London with a slow increase up until COVID restrictions being introduced followed by an increase as restrictions eased. There is a further fall during the second lockdown with a continued rise thereafter. Different to many areas in London is that reported crime and ASB has now reached the highest level over the three years period.



The graph below sets out the types of crime reported over the 3-year period.




The following graphs provide the same data sets for 'Stanley' over the same 3-year period.



The tracking for 'Stanley' is far more subtle in terms of change and more reflective of other neighbourhoods with previous peaks not yet repeated or exceeded.

The following graphs provide the same data sets for 'Chelsea Riverside' over the same 3-year period.



- Theft person includes theft by snatch and pickpocketing.
- Theft other is a very wide group of offences but for interpretation of this report includes distraction thefts and theft of unattended items.
- Violence and sexual offences include all violent and sexual offences including domestic violence.
- Robbery is any theft where force is used or threatened in order to steal.
- Shoplifting is any theft of merchandise on public display from a retailer other than that by an employee.
- Theft of bicycles is as suggested the theft of pedal bikes.

With the exception of robbery those offences listed are of concern due to the volume.

The tracking for 'Chelsea Riverside' is very similar to that for 'Stanley'.

By examining the associated crime mapping within the BID footprint for each policing neighbourhood so as to focus on the subset of the BID the following crimes are of concern.

**Royal Hospital.**

- Vehicle crime.
- Violence and sexual offences.
- Theft person.

**Stanley.**

- Shoplifting.
- Theft person.
- Theft other.
- Robbery.

**Chelsea Riverside.**

- Violence and sexual offences.
- Theft other.
- Vehicle crime.
- Theft of bicycles.

By way of explanation:

- Vehicle crime includes theft from, theft of and criminal damage to vehicles.

Robbery is included as such offences in the area tend to be offenders targeting victims with high value watches or those using mobile phones. The volume is not high, but the constant nature of property types targeted, and levels of extreme violence used are of significant concern.

Hotspots for theft person tend to be close to transport termini, F&B businesses and near to the exits of retailers along with quiet roads close to the BID area.

**Public Realm Audit.**

The visual environmental audits were carried out at various times of the day and on different days of the week. The audits looked at the BID area and the streets immediately adjacent to it.

Kings Road is the main thoroughfare linking Sloane Square to Fulham passing through a vibrant retail and F&B area with a night economy to the western edge of the BID. This area is flanked by residential streets.

The pavements have high levels of pedestrians for most of the retail trading day and at weekends this

extends in terms of timeframe towards the west due to the later offerings.

Road traffic is heavy during the day and does not tend to ease until past 8pm and later at the weekends.

However, there are points on Kings Road where the congestion is less pronounced allowing vehicles to potentially move at high speeds.

There are heritage style cast iron bollards towards the east, but it is not known if these are PAS 68 rated. The presence of such bollards reduces as one moves west.

In considering a potential Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device attack (as recently seen at Liverpool's Women's Hospital) or a crash followed by a marauding knife attack (as seen at London Bridge / Borough Market) there appears to be insufficient hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) in the area.

This is complicated by the current narrow width of pavements in places which presents potential challenges for HVM installation within the current public realm design including areas of high footfall as observed outside 'Ivy Asia' on several occasions. These areas are obvious risks and should be reviewed with RBKC, relevant landowners and the BID management in light of impending 'Duty to Protect' legislation.

**Recommendation 1.** The potential installation of HVM and traffic management is taken forward as a stand-alone project by the BID in concert with RBKC, land/estate owners with the assistance of a Counter Terrorism Security Advisor. **(Long term)**

There is minimal public realm CCTV with that in place apparently outsourced to Hammersmith and Fulham. It is not known, and to-date could not be ascertained, what crime profile updates are provided to those monitoring cameras. Given that effective monitoring is the pivotal factor this needs to be reviewed immediately across the partnership. A further gap is how monitoring links into response to reduce and prevent crime and disorder along with partnership KPI's. At the time of this report the BID security team are not linked into any CCTV partnership.

**Recommendation 2.** Complete a public realm CCTV audit with partners and make recommendations for future expansion, monitoring, and response for public realm CCTV in the area. **(medium term)**

The area is plagued by escort cards being placed into phone boxes. This is an issue that also affects The Knightsbridge Partnership, HoLBA, NWEK and Fitzrovia Partnership BID areas with intelligence linking a small cohort to the distribution.

The visual impact is negative and undermines the ambition for the area.

**Recommendation 3.** The BID works with adjacent and nearby BID's to exert pressure on British Telecom and statutory partners to address the offenders and make the area hostile to them through enforcement. **(Short to medium term)**

There are a number of bike hoops across the footprint with some having apparent remnants of bike parts from thefts in place and abandoned rusty locks.

This leaves the impression that the area suffers from bike crime and put potential cyclists off of using such modes of transport.

In addition, street furniture can give a messy and cluttered visual appearance that attracts would-be offenders.



**Recommendation 4.** The existing bike security hoops are decluttered. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 5.** Work with landowners and bike storage companies to establish a bike park/drop facility within a building as seen in parts of the West End. **(Medium term)**



Vacant properties managed by large organisations were well dressed and despite being empty did not detract from the area. However, other vacant properties looked as though they had been abandoned and created a sense of an area in decay. It was noticeable that street begging and was present in these areas in line with what would be expected when considering 'Broken Windows Theory'.

A number of those observed begging appeared to be from organised groups evident by them having the cards with pleas for money written by what appears to be the same hand on them. Some were clearly working in concert with each other.



**Recommendation 6.** Work with all landowners to establish an agreed minimum standard for the dressing of vacant properties. **(Medium to long term)**

There was build-up of rubbish bags throughout the day with some bags left uncollected beyond 24-hours. There were bags indicating various collection agents. However, those left for long periods detracted from the sense of wellbeing along with adding to the potential for attracting anti-social behaviour. Several bags appeared to have been poor sealed and secured

**Recommendation 7.** Establish contact details for all refuse collection agents along with agreeing an escalation process for uncollected rubbish. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 8.** Commence a waste education program with businesses where the non-collection of rubbish is a repeat issue and/or driver for ASB. **(short term)**

During the audits neither police nor local authority warden foot patrols were observed. It is accepted that both have limited assets. In respect of the police dedicated ward officers they have a far larger footprint than the BID area to cover.

**Recommendation 9.** Negotiate with the MPS and RBKC for a diarised program of joint patrols with the BID street wardens and a co-ordinated deployment of assets. **(Short term)**



## Business Audit.

The audit interviews with members looked at the following key areas:

- Internal security provisions.
- CCTV and radio communications.
- Intelligence flow.
- Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.
- Steps taken in preparedness for a critical Incident / terrorist attack.
- Possession of 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.

### Internal security provisions.

#### Retail.

Larger stores and some high-end international boutiques tended to have in-store security support. These venues had clear instructions for security staff. However, for most this does not include any input of localised crime and ASB issues. All are now linked in with the BID security albeit they are using WhatsApp which is not GDPR compliant.

For SME and smaller boutiques, the presence of licensed security is limited and for most non-existent. In these locations it was evident that general staff did not have any meaningful security briefing as part of induction with many staff moving on within relatively short periods of time. Most were also unaware of the crime and ASB profile for the area.

#### F&B / NTE.

None of the F&B venues interviewed had any security as a matter of course.

However, NTE venues such as Raffles do have security which is included in their licence conditions.

However, the exodus from this venue has historically caused crime and ASB issues for local residents (Paultons Street/Square) in close proximity. This has resulted in the residents paying for overnight security patrols and created potential opposition to their premises licence.

### Landowners / Management.

Local landowners and their facilities management teams were in part supported by outsourced security teams with some sight on local crime and ASB issues.

Most staff receive a security briefing during induction relating to the operation of the business. There is generally no input on local crime and ASB.

None were yet linked into the BID security wardens.

**Recommendation 10.** Formal introductions are arranged for the BID wardens to meet the Landowners/management out-sourced security teams. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 11.** The BID works with the landowners, RBKC and MPS to harmonise and maximise the coverage of their combined security / police assets through a tasking and co-ordination process. **(Short term)**

### CCTV and radio communications.

#### Retail.

Most locations visited had in store CCTV systems ranging from state-of-the-art to older systems.

For many the staff on site were unable to operate the systems potentially slowing down the sharing of dynamic intelligence.

The large stores and high-end international boutiques all had GDPR policies and a process to download and hand over recordings to police.

Many staff at independent stores venues had no knowledge of such processes being in place.

Large retailers and international boutiques had internal communication systems. Of note was that where venues had the same security vendor they were in communication with colleagues in different stores or within their chain across the West End and RKBC.

Smaller venues and boutiques did not have radio systems, but many were on a WhatsApp group where live events were shared. Whilst WhatsApp is effective and efficient as previously stated it is not GDPR compliant.

## **F&B.**

None of the F&B locations had any radio link internally or externally.

Most had CCTV with some managed by a company centralised office. It was not possible to ascertain if they had GDPR policies but given the centralised nature of some this is highly likely.

Where downloading had a localised capacity staff were not aware of GDPR requirements.

## **Landowners / Management.**

This group had sizable internal CCTV coverage but limited collateral views onto the public realm.

All had GDPR policies.

All had internal radio systems for facilities management.

## **Strategic position.**

The area has some public realm CCTV owned by RBKC. The latter is monitored by a 24/7 control room outsourced to Hammersmith and Fulham.

**Recommendation 12.** Dialogue is started to look at if, and how, the BID can persuade RBKC to extend the existing 24/7 CCTV presence and monitoring within the BID footprint. This includes the potential use of CIL. **(Medium Term)**

**Recommendation 13.** A CCTV audit of businesses is completed to ascertain areas covered, SPOC's for each business should be established and identify blind spots. This should be made available to police and local authorities in the event of a critical incident or terrorist attack. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 14.** Consider joining Safer Business Network with a view to the provision of a GDPR compliant system for members. **(Short term)**

## **Intelligence flow.**

### **Retail.**

The process of sharing local intelligence is limited to the WhatsApp group.

Some companies had ad hoc intelligence flows depending on their group set up.

### **F&B.**

Intelligence flow within this sector was minimal and reflective of that apparent in retail.

### **Landowners / Management.**

Intelligence sharing amongst those interviewed was primarily internal with members of senior management receiving broad updates on crime in Central London through partnership meetings.

## **Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.**

### **Retail.**

Common concerns were shoplifting, the theft of bags and phones and a significant concern over watch robberies very close to the BID area with Pavilion Road, Sloane Gardens and Holbein Place.

Several retailers were worried about the level of begging and its apparent organised nature although they acknowledged reduction since the BID security had been established.

Some staff who worked alone or in small teams also raised concerns about opening and locking up at night expressing a feeling of being vulnerable. Many of these staff are female with some referencing the murder of Sarah Everard.

Many retailers did not report all crimes within their venues including shoplifting and credit card fraud which tend to be volume crime types. The common narrative was they did not want to take up valuable police resource and that 101 was rarely answered in a timely manner.



The bi-product of this is that police intelligence becomes inaccurate and potentially impacts on the deployment of police assets allowing such problems to continue with little chance of any consequence.

Without being able to quantify the level of under-reporting in this audit it is likely that the level is significant. This presents a further problem as crime levels are a component for the allocation of policing resources nationally and locally.

There was limited knowledge within this sector about what constituted ASB and to whom it should be reported.

### **F&B.**

This sector raised concerns regarding table surfing, bag thefts along with female members of staff being harassed.

The presence of organised beggars taking up positions outside the venues with no apparent organisation to move them on was raised. However, they stated they had already seen a positive difference with the introduction of the BID security whom they often called upon.

Crimes are rarely reported unless it is an act of violence towards a member of staff or company property was involved. Where the victim is a customer the decision to report is predominantly left with the victim.

There was limited knowledge within this sector about what constituted ASB and to whom it should be reported.

### **Landowners / Management.**

A number of concerns were raised with public realm-based theft offences including shoplifting, distraction theft, robberies/snatches and begging being cited.

Where a tenant was the victim of an offence or subjected to any ASB it was left to the tenant to report.

**Recommendation 15.** Start a program of short workshops supporting businesses understand why and how to report crime and ASB to police and the relevant local authority. (Many were unaware of how to report on-line.) **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 16.** Provide safety workshops for staff in the area including Welfare and Vulnerability, steps taken in preparedness for a critical incident/terrorist attack. **(Short to medium term)**

### **Retail.**

When looking at the 'Prepare' and 'Prevent' aspects of the governments counter terrorism strategy - 'Contest' there was a limited awareness of free online training (ACT/Scan). This is now a requirement for SIA licensed operatives with those holding existing licences needing to complete an on-line module along with a first aid at work qualification at renewal of their licence (every 3-years). Some businesses were unaware of this requirement and rely solely on their security providers to maintain the required qualifications.

There was a view the ACT/Scan was for security licensed staff only. Some have been provided with the link to free on-line government training.

<https://ct.highfieldlearning.com>

The understanding of the likely impact of Duty to Protect arising from The Manchester Arena Inquiry was limited with few retailers starting to assess what, if any, changes they may need to introduce. With Chapter 1 of the inquiry published there are some clear indications of the areas where legislative changes are likely to happen.

All retailers had documented evacuation plans but no 'lock in' plans were evident.

### **F&B.**

One of the F&B businesses interviewed insist all managers complete the on-line ACT/Scan training (McDonald's).

None of the others were aware of the training.

At a corporate level one of the businesses was actively looking at the impact of 'Duty to Protect' legislation (McDonald's) but this was a unique position within the cohort interviewed in this sector.

All had evacuation plans that were documented and formed part of onboarding induction. However, concern was raised over the volume of staff turnover and trying to maintain this moving forward.

None of the businesses interviewed had a lock in plan.

### **Landowners / Management.**

In this group ACT/Scan was limited to those working in security and those in management roles.

All had evacuation plans but none had a defined lock in procedures.

**Recommendation 17.** Approach West End Security Group with a view to joining to access support around supporting the BID and its members prepare for critical incidents and acts of terrorism. **(Medium term)**

**Recommendation 18.** Arrange and facilitate annual tabletop exercises with members to test readiness for a critical incident / terrorist attack. **(Medium term)**

**Recommendation 19.** Arrange and facilitate 'Servator' training sessions with the MPS for BID based security teams. - Servator provides a form of behavioural assessments and how to engage with those deemed to be a potential risk. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 20.** Promote the on-line and free ACT/Scan training to all businesses. **(Short term)**

### **Possessions of first aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.**

#### **Retail**

All had 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits, but none had trauma packs or defibrillators.

None knew where, the defibrillators were registered or how to locate them.

#### **F&B.**

All had 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits, but none had trauma packs or defibrillators.

#### **Landowners / Management.**

All had 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits and defibrillators but not trauma packs.

**Recommendation 21.** To purchase and locate a number of trauma packs over the BID area (these should be businesses with a 24/7 operation) along with the associated training. **(Medium term)**

**Recommendation 22.** Persuade businesses with defibrillators to register them with 'GoodSAM' - <https://www.goodsamapp.org/> so that they can be located in an emergency and get staff to download the 'GoodSAM alerter' application. This provides instant advice, location, and link to the emergency services along with detailing where the nearest registered defibrillator is. **(Short term)**

## Conclusions.

Crime and ASB was a clear major concern for nearly all of those interviewed with key locations broadly mirrored by the visual audit.

Several female staff working in retail raised concerns about their personal safety with both opening and closing times a prime worry for them.


There is a clear level of under reporting for both crime and ASB. My concern is the impact on the accuracy of intelligence across the BID area leading to the incorrect deployment of assets and tactics along with poor maintenance and control of the public realm.

The perception that the presence of police and RBKC wardens was, at best, limited may be part of the reason why certain crimes and incidents of ASB are not being reported along with a 101-system deemed not fit for purpose.

The picture of communication within private security across the area is fragmented and constructed around the nature of the business, who provides the licensed security staff and the use of WhatsApp which is not GDPR compliant.

**Recommendation 23** Form a security forum to support the reduction of crime and accuracy of intelligence that can be used to influence local policing priorities. This could be expanded to businesses in adjacent areas such as Pavilion Road and Sloane Street (Southern sections) and Sloane Square. **(Short term)**

**Recommendation 24.** Evolve a retail crime reduction strategy over the tenure of the BID as attached. **(Short to long term)**



The area has a substantial number of CCTV systems in operation but that in the public realm is limited. Given the International profile of the BID area this is a significant concern exacerbated when overlaid with the initial comments of Sir John Saunders – Chair of The Manchester Arena Inquiry.

In terms of preparedness for critical incident or terrorist attack businesses were in wide range of positions.

Landowners, large chain stores and some luxury boutiques were well versed with appropriate training in place.

Other businesses are virtually unsighted with little or no knowledge of Government advice to businesses, ACT/Scan training or the potential impact of legislative changes on the horizon.

There is a limited distribution of defibrillators across the area most staff are unsighted on their location including staff within the businesses that have purchased them. It appears to be unlikely that any are registered on any national scheme.

Whilst all businesses had 1<sup>st</sup> aid kits trauma packs and the associated required training were absent.

The area has the basis on being able to evolve a strong partnership security framework but will require greater integration across the different types with the following recommended as the key strategic strands for delivery of a stronger security eco-system where security is accepted as a key tenant for all staff and businesses in the BID area and not just law enforcement and private security.

- Communication.
- Intelligence.
- CCTV.
- Long-term problem solving.
- Preparedness for a major incident / terrorist attack.

The recommendations set out are proposed to be considered by the BID board to evolve the effectiveness of security across the BID area along with improving resilience in the event of a major incident or terrorist attack.

